
Diving into the sewers to improve public health

Amy E. Kirby, PhD MPH

National Wastewater Surveillance System Program Lead Waterborne Disease Prevention Branch

Beyond TB Lecture North American Region Annual TB Meeting February 24, 2023






cdc.gov/NWSS




























4. Aerosols carried to upper apartments and adjacent buildings by air current

2. Virus-laden aerosols created as waste is discharged

Gormley et al. 2017

3. Transmission of aerosols to upper apartment via depleted U-trap

Infected resident introduces virus to drainage system

FÉATURES

Environmental Transmission of SARS at Amoy Gardens McKinney, Kelly R;Yu Yang Gong;Lewis, Thomas G Journal of Environmental Health; May 2006; 68, 9; ProQuest pg. 26



Environmental Transmission of SARS at Amoy Gardens

Kelly R. McKinney, P.E. Yu Yang Gong, Ph.D., P.E. Thomas G. Lewis, P.E., J.D.

The process of wastewater surveillance

Individuals use toilet on sewer system



The sample is processed, concentrated, and genomic material is extracted



Raw data is received, analyzed, and visualized


















At a centralized treatment plant, or sampling point, a grab or composite sample is collected




RNA, the genomic material of SARS-CoV-2, is then amplified and detected



Metrics can be used to inform public health decisions

Wastewater is a leading indicator of SARS-CoV-2 case trends

Sewage concentrations correlate with confirmed <u>cases</u> ~4-6 days in the future.



Correlation between sewage concentration 1.0 0.5 and case counts -1.0 Sewage leading cases by x days



Time Series

Correlation

SARS-CoV-2 wastewate Surveillance of wastewater revealed data can predict hospit, peaks of SARS-CoV-2 preceding those of Post-lockdown detect hospitalized patients with COVID-19

SARS-CoV-2 titers in wastewater foreshadow dynamics and clinical presentation of new COVID-19 cases

Fuqing Wu, 1,2,† Amy Xiao, 1,2,† Jianbo Zhang, 1,2,†

Newsha Ghaeli, 3 Xiaoqiong Gu, 4,5 William P Hana Kyle A McElroy,3 Jonathan Nagler,6 Steven F Rho Stefan Wuertz,5,15,16 Shijie Zhao,1,2 Janelle Thom

surveillance of COVID-19 in community

Warish Ahmed ^a Q M, Nicola Angel ^b, Janette Edson ^b Jake W. O'Brien^d, Phil M. Choi^d, Masaaki Kitajima^e, St Ben Tscharke ^d, Rory Verhagen ^d, Wendy J.M. Smith ^g, Ju Leanne Dierens b, Philip Hugenholtz b, Kevin V. Thomas

Megan A Brown, Mary Bushman, Peter R Chai, SARS-CoV-2 RNA monitoring in wastewater as a potential early warning system for COVID-19 transmission in the community: A temporal case study

Warish Ahmed ^{a 1} A Ben Tscharke ^{b 1}, Paul M. Bertsch ^a, Kyle Bibby ^c, Aaron Bivins c, Phil Choi b, Leah Clarke b, Jason Dwyer e, Janette Edson f, Thi Minh Hong Nguyen b, Jake W. O'Brien b, Stuart L. Simpson d, Paul Sherman e, Kevin V. Thomas b, Rory Verhagen b, Julian Zaugg f, Jochen F. Mueller b

Detection of SARCo Long-t Coordination of SARS-CoV-2 wastewater Wastewater surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 es the importance in dorm Implementing building-level SARS-CoV-2 wastewater surveillance on a Waste rofiles university campus ls a 20G ot <u>Cynthia Gibas</u> ^{a b} ∠ ⋈, <u>Kevin Lambirth</u> ^a ⋈, <u>Neha Mittal</u> ^a, <u>Md Ariful Islam Juel</u> ^c, Visva Bharati Barua c, Lauren Roppolo Brazell a, Keshawn Hinton a, Jordan Lontai e, Candice L. Sv ARS-Nicholas Stark a, Isaiah Young c, Cristine Quach c, Morgan Russ a, Jacob Kauer a, Zuzana Bohrero Bridgette Nicolosi a, Don Chen g, Srinivas Akella d, Wenwu Tang e f, versity Noluxabiso Mang Jessica Schlueter a b, Mariya Munir c Wolfgang Preiser , dideon won campus bunungs Alno Carstens b, Ludwig Brocker b Renee Street j, Angela Mathee i, Jo Claire M. Welling a, David R. Singleton b, Steven B. Haase c, Christian H. Browning d, Rabia Johnson a g 🔼 🖂 Brian R. Stoner a, Claudia K. Gunsch b, Sonia Grego a 🙎 🖂

Notes from the Field: Early Evidence of the SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.529 (Omicron) Variant in Community Wastewater — United States, November-December 2021

Weekly / January 21, 2022 / 71(3);103-105

	First Wastewater Detection		First Clinical Cases
California	11/25	1 site	Tested 11/28
Colorado	12/2	1 site	Tested 11/29
Houston	11/29	7 sites	Tested 12/1, 2 cases
New York City	11/21	1 site	Tested 11/24

Wastewater detections indicated wider geographic presence than known at the time

Earliest evidence of the presence of Omicron in the US

Wastewater data informs public health action



- ✓ Independent confirmation of true increases or decreases in cases
- ✓ Use of data for public facing dashboards
- ✓ Public health messaging
- ✓ Regularly informing local public health leadership
- ✓ Distribution, siting of test capacity
- ✓ Surveillance data in communities where clinical testing is limited or not available
- ✓ Near-term forecasting of cases or hospital utilization
- ✓ Detecting the emergence of Variants of Concern




Limitations of Wastewater Surveillance

- ~25% of US residences are not connected to sewer
- Decentralized wastewater treatment facilities will not be captured
- Low incidence may be below the limit of detection
- Cannot be used to "clear" a community or facility
- May be impacted by pre-treatment of sewage at facility level or at WWTP for odor or worker safety







Summary


- Wastewater surveillance has proven to be a valuable component of the COVID-19 pandemic response with increasing importance to understand trends and variants
- Looking forward, a national wastewater surveillance system should be equitable, sustainable, integrated, actionable, and flexible.
- CDC should develop a transparent process for prioritizing new targets and work to address privacy concerns
- Predictable and sustained federal funding and coordination/collaboration among many partners will be critical to the effectiveness



Implementing wastewater surveillance at a national scale



NATIONAL WASTEWATER SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (NWSS)





Laboratories

treatment plants

NWSS is a collaboration between Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and agencies throughout the federal government.




U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention


cdc.gov/coronavirus

NWSS Implementation | 2020 - 2023

CDC Funds Jurisdictions to Support Wastewater Surveillance




- 46 states, 5 major cities and 2 territories using CDC funds for wastewater surveillance
- 2 Centers of Excellence





- >133,000 unique wastewater samples
- >1400 sites in 50 states, 3 territories and 7 Tribal communities
- Representing >140M people

DCIPHER dashboard | One-stop shop for implementers



Metric	What does this show us?
Percentiles	Relative levels of virus present in a community over time
Percent Change	Magnitude and direction of virus levels in a community
Detection Proportion	How frequently is the virus detected in a community
Variant Specific Metrics	If a known variant is present, and at what proportion


Also includes-

- Resource library
- Contact list
- Automated QC reports
- Automated utility reports
- Support forum




NWSS platform is rapidly adaptable for additional analyses

SARS-CoV-2 Trends



COVID Data Tracker
Wastewater Surveillance

SARS-CoV-2 Variants



COVID Data Tracker Variant Surveillance

Mpox Detections




Mpox Wastewater Public
Data



On-site wastewater testing in correctional facilities can support COVID mitigation efforts






Sampling location and consistency are critical for successful facility-level surveillance

Inconsistent testing

Poor sampling location or method

Alternative sanitation options?




Population turnover
Poor sampling

location or method

Inconsistent testing

Wastewater surveillance beyond COVID







surveilla outbreak

Municipa Wastewater Surveillance Captured an Increase in Adenovirus Circulation in Milan (Italy) during the First Quarter of 2022

by 🚇 Laura Pellegrinelli 1,* 🖂 🕩, 🚇 Sara Colonia Uceda Renteria 2 🕩, 🚇 Ferruccio Ceriotti 2 🕩, Emanuela Ammoni ³,
Cristina Galli ¹

Arlinda Seiti ¹,
Sara Castiglioni ⁴

And Canallo Cereda ³,

Antibiotic resistance in European wastewater treatment plants mirrors the pattern of clinical antibiotic resistance prevalence

KATARIINA M. M. PÄRNÄNEN (D), CARLOS NARCISO-DA-ROCHA (D), DAVID KNEIS (D), THOMAS U. BERENDONK (D), DAMIANO CACACE (D), THI THUY DO,

+16 authors CHRISTIAN ELPERS, DESPO FATTA-KASSINOS, ISABEL HENRIQUES, [...], AND CÉLIA M. MANAIA Authors Info & Affiliations

Community-Scale Wastewater Surveillance of Candida auris during an Ongoing Outbreak in Southern Nevada

Casey Barber, Katherine Crank, Katerina Papp, Gabriel K. Innes, Bradley W. Schmitz, Jorge Chavez, Alessandro Rossi, and Daniel Gerrity*

Evaluating a New Wastewater Target

- Is the virus shed into wastewater?
 - Fecal shedding prevalence, magnitude, duration, and infectivity?
- Can clinical assays be adapted for wastewater?
 - Can virus be recovered and quantified reliably?
 - Are other, non-specific targets detected (false positives)?
- What is the geographic distribution of cases?
 - Are there enough cases in a sewershed to be detectable?
 - What is the case ascertainment rate and timing?
- Do trends reflect case incidence or prevalence?
- Are there meaningful public health actions at the community level?

Core

- Regular surveillance for endemic or <u>common</u> diseases, such as flu or antibiotic resistance genes
- Provides regular, consistent, cost-effective surveillance

Emergency

- Rapid response for outbreaks, emergencies, natural disasters
- Sporadic but expected diseases, such as shigellosis or polio
- Rapidly deployable portfolio of validated assays

Pandemic preparedness

- Horizon scanning for potential epidemic or pandemic threats
- Evaluation of potential <u>rare, unexpected</u> diseases such as Ebola or Mpox
- Biosecurity Early Warning



NWSS Panel for Core Targets*

- Normalization Controls
 - Pepper Mild Mottle Virus
 - Crassphage
- Process Control
 - Bovine Coronavirus
- Antibiotic resistance genes
 - Carbapenemases (NDM, VIM, KPC, OXA-48, IMP
 - ESBLs (CMY, CTX-M-1, TEM, SHV)
 - Colistin resistance (*mcr-1*)
 - Vancomycin resistance (vanA)

- Respiratory viruses
 - SARS-CoV-2
 - Influenza A and B
 - Respiratory Syncytial Virus
- Enteric pathogens
 - Adenovirus 40/41
 - Shiga-toxin-producing *E. coli*
 - Campylobacter
 - Norovirus
 - Cyclospora cayetanesis
- Emerging pathogens
 - Candida auris
 - Mpox (non-Variola Orthopox)

Ethical considerations grow alongside the field



Traceback



Choosing surveillance targets



Stigma/blame on communities



Future use of archived samples



Sample and data access



Acknowledging past public health harms



Challenges for NWSS development and sustainability



Extending coverage, 20% unsewered



Impact of vaccination and variants



Optimal geographic and temporal sampling frame for multiple targets




Improved data submission, dissemination, messaging



Improved methods, streamlined workflow



Ethical transparency, especially around sample archiving



Death certificates

Incomplete cause of death

Medical Records
Billing codes
Laboratory Reporting

HOSPITALIZED

DEATHS

Incorrect billing codes


AMBULATORY CARE

No systematic clinical surveillance

COMMUNITY INFECTIONS

No lab test
Treated at home
No symptoms





For more information, contact CDC 1-800-CDC-INFO (232-4636)

TTY: 1-888-232-6348 www.cdc.gov

For more information: NWSS@cdc.gov

www.cdc.gov/NWSS

The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

